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Although bureaucratic corruption plagues many countries, researchers struggle to recommend ways to deter it.
Aksel Sundström argues that the effect of violent intimidation by people trying to bribe enforcement officers has
been largely overlooked. He suggests that protection schemes for officials may have the potential to reduce the
costs of honest behaviour.
David Birney as Serpico in the eponymous TV series, 1976. Photo: NBC Television (eBay item photo front press release). Public
domain via Wikimedia Commons
In remote parts of countries like Mexico or Afghanistan, widespread bribery involving customs officers, policemen or
civil servants fuels criminal behaviour such as smuggling. Tackling this kind of institutionalised corruption is one of
the main challenges impeding social progress in countries where the rule of law is weak. Using qualitative interview
data from places where corruption and violent intimidation are endemic, I tried to gain further understanding of the
problem.
While corruption is a topic of immense interest for policy-makers, there are gaps in our understanding of how we can
reduce it. Perhaps more fundamentally, do we understand the drivers of small-scale corruption in the first place?
Not only are we struggling to find the right cure for this sickness, but we also have trouble diagnosing it in the first
place.
So why do officials accept bribes from people who want to break the law? The anti-corruption discussion has usually
focused on civil servants’ calculation that the gains from corruption will outweigh the potential risk of getting caught,
and the potential ramifications of losing their job. According to this interpretation, the solutions include increased
salaries, higher penalties for wrongdoers and more elaborate monitoring. Others have suggested that bribery may
also be a problem of collective action, where very few officials in a highly corrupt administration want to be the only
ones who do not take bribes.
But do these explanations take violent contexts into account? Returning to the situation of a customs officer in
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Mexico or Afghanistan, these perspectives seems to pay insufficient heed to the role of violence and the physical
security of officials. A bureaucrat in such a setting is likely to come under pressure from criminals who wish to break
the law. In the political sphere, previous studies have used the term plata o plomo (Spanish for “silver or lead”),
meaning “your money or your life”, to signify situations where agents were forced to engage in corrupt practices.
This is relevant to our understanding of bureaucratic corruption too.
In a recent article for Public Administration, I focused on a South African government authority faced with the
challenge of enforcing regulations to hinder poaching in the marine sector. During 2014, I interviewed inspectors
working in rural areas – who were asked to talk freely, and promised anonymity. They described the difficult
conditions in which they work:
“Last week some person there threatened us with stones. So we just had to let him walk away with
poached resources. See this scar [shows his chin], a poacher cut me here two years ago” –
(anonymous inspector).
“[Fishermen may] threaten that they are going to burn your house. This happened to a colleague …
There was a case a while back when poachers kidnapped the wife of an inspector. This inspector
was enforcing too. So there is a balance” – (anonymous inspector).
In practice, this ‘balance’ often means that inspectors start to be pragmatic when enforcing rules. Being lax with
fishermen who violate rules is, in such a situation, the easier choice:
“[A colleague] approached some guys who were coming up from the water. And he was stabbed …
You cannot be too headstrong. If I see poaching I say to them kindly to throw it in. And I will not write
a fine … So you show a nice attitude” – (anonymous inspector).
It is in such situations that violence seems to affect the decision of whether to accept a bribe:
“Since we work in a dangerous community with poaching, it’s a choice between honest work and a
relaxed lifestyle where you turn a blind eye or become a part of this business [of accepting bribes]” –
(anonymous inspector).
Inspectors who collude with poachers work as informants, sharing information about enforcement operations. This
has consequences for inspectors who refuse bribes:
“Three years ago I did a bust and it went bad. They threw a firebomb, burning me. And we
exchanged gunfire. So they put a price on my head … I had to move to this station. And the sad thing
is that it was my own people who had tipped them off, sharing information about this operation” –
(anonymous inspector).
These interviews show that corrupt actors seem to prefer inspectors to engage in corruption rather than just
standing by. One explanation could be that the number of potential whistleblowers decreases as the number of
bureaucrats on payrolls rises.
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The pressure from corrupt colleagues is also visible:
“Being the only inspector at a station that does not accept bribes and that enforces rules hard, it is
dangerous. You will be a threat to the livelihood of inspector colleagues … So you might be
threatened because of this” – (anonymous inspector).
Accepting bribes solves many of these problems, and cuts down the number of threats:
“If you take bribes you are protected. You have a role in the community. You got organisation
protection and police protection. In the community this is a social thing. They will start helping you.
Some inspectors even help the poachers drive their vehicles. So it’s protection, social protection”
(anonymous inspector).
Given ignoring rule violations is easier than enforcing the law, some of the inspectors explained that the choice to
take bribes may reduce the threats from fishermen:
“Our personnel are scared to confront poachers … Instead [of enforcing rules] you start becoming
less proud and ethical” – (anonymous inspector).
In the light of such accounts, it is questionable that a higher salary or harsher punishment would mitigate the
problems facing these officials. What might work better is the introduction of protection schemes for law enforcement
personnel. They often live near the people who are threatening them. Threat assessments might increase the
security of officials in such contexts, and how to design such schemes is an important task for future research.
South Africa is not the only country where there are costs associated with honesty. There are similar anecdotes from
administrations in richer parts of the world. The New York City Police Department in the 1960s was made famous
by the Hollywood movie Serpico, starring Al Pacino. In reality, Frank Serpico – a patrolling policeman who received
death threats and became a pariah among colleagues after testifying about corrupt practices – witnessed in 1971
the consequences of refusing bribery: “The atmosphere does not yet exist in which an honest police officer can act
without fear of ridicule or reprisal from fellow officers”, he said (quoted in the New York Times, 2010).
Full article:  Sundström, Aksel (2016) “Violence and the costs of honesty: Rethinking bureaucrats’ choice to take
bribes” Public Administration , 94 (3): 593–608.
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